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THE DIMINISHING DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN SELLING AND LEASING
TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
RICHARD MARSHALL ABRAMSf
I. INTRODUCTION
THE LAW OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY has long rec-ognized the distinction between sales and leases:
A sale transfers ownership and possession of the article in ex-
change for the price; a bailment for hire [lease] transfers possession
in exchange for the rental and contemplates eventual return of the
article to the owner. By means of a bailment parties can often
reach the same business ends that can be achieved by selling and
buying. 1
The two categories of tangible personal property leases are the con-
ventional or "true" lease and the finance or "security" lease. 2 The
true lease is a bailment for hire in accordance with what is commonly
meant by the term "lease." 3  The finance lease is basically a type of
security agreement or secured installment sales contract in which a
financier purchases property from the actual supplier and then rents
it to the lessee. 4 In a true lease, the lessor is the supplier of the
B.S.B.A. Bucknell University, 1969; J.D., Harvard University, 1972. Member, Pennsyl-
vania Bar.
1. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 447, 212 A.2d 769, 776
(1965). See Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV.
653, 655 (1957); Comment, The Extension of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to
Leases of Goods, 12 TULSA L.J. 556, 557-58 (1977).
2. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-3, at 759-65
(1972). The Uniform Commercial Code defines a "security interest" as "an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C.
§ 1-201(37). This section also provides that "[wihether a lease is intended as security is to be
determined by the facts of each case." Id. See also Peden, The Treatment of Equipment Leases
as Security Agreements under the Uniforn Commercial Code, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 110
(1971); Note, 84 YALE L.J. 1722, 1723 (1975).
3. See 1B BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE, SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 29B.02[2], at 2989-90 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
SECURED TRANSACTIONS]; id. § 29A.02-.03, at 2917-22; DeKoven, Leases of Equipment: Puritan
Leasing Company v. August, A Dangerous Decision, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 257, 258 (1978).
4. See I SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra note 3, § 4A.06, at 4A-73 to 4A-112 (1977); De-
Koven, supra note 3, at 258; Note, 56 NEB. L. REV. 354, 354 (1977).
It has been suggested that there are two kinds of leases that are security interests. J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 22-3, at 762-65. The first is a secured installment sale
drafted in lease terminology. Id. at 762. The second transaction resembles a lease exactly but
the "economic realitites" mandate a purchase by the lessee at the end of the term. Id. at
(706)
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product and expects its return at the end of the lease term; in a
finance lease, the lessor is not the supplier but rather the financier or
secured party whose collateral is the product and who does not ex-
pect its return at the end of the lease term. 5 A finance lessor
supplies the use of money instead of a product.6 Whereas a true
lessor has a reversionary right in the product, a finance lessor has a
security interest in the product. 7
Since the finance lease is essentially a financing arrangement in
the form of a lease, it will not be considered further. The remainder
of this article will deal exclusively with the true lease and its compari-
son with an outright sale.
The basic distinction between a lease and a sale is that the pas-
sage of title occurs in a sale but not in a lease. 8 It is submitted that
the consequences of that distinction are rapidly diminishing. Some
courts look more at the purpose and substance of the transaction than
its form or the passage of title.9 This type of analysis has impliedly
rejected the notion that the passage or retention of title automatically
763-64. Courts have characterized both of these transactions as security interests. See id. One
commentator has suggested that three elements must be considered in determining whether a
lease is a finance lease: "(1) there must be an agreement by the lessee to pay the lessor a set
amount; (2) such amount must be equivalent to the value of the leased goods; and (3) the lessee
must become the owner of or have the option to become the owner of the leased goods."
DeKoven, supra note 3, at 259 (footnote omitted).
A finance lease which is found to be a security agreement will subject the lessor to the
filing and perfection requirements of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, U.C.C. art. 9.
See id. § 9-102 (1)(a). A secured party lessor will also be subject to the Uniform Commercial
Code's remedial provisions in event of the lessee's default. Id. § 9-504.
5. See In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1390, 1392-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), re-
manded for evidentiary hearing, 486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1973); Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck
Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 369 n.3, 372 A.2d 736, 740 n.3 (1977); Claxton, Lease or Security Interest:
A Classic Problem of Commercial Law, 28 MERCER L. REV. 599 (1977); DeKoven, supra note
3, at 259; Note, Warranties in the Leasing of Goods, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 140, 147-50 (1970);
Note, supra note 4, at 358-59; Note, supra note 2, at 1723. See also U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
6. See Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 369 n.3, 372 A.2d 736, 740 n.3
(1977).
7. Note, supra note 2, at 1723.
8. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 447, 212 A.2d 769, 776
(1965). The Uniform Commercial Code states that "[a] 'sale' consists in the passing of title from
the seller to the buyer for a price." U.C.C. § 2-106(1). A lease, on the other hand, "merely
transfers possession in exchange for the rental and contemplates the return of the chattel to the
owner." Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 655.
9. See, e.g., KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Electronics Corp., 465 F.2d 1382, 1385 (8th Cir.
1972) (lease of television broadcasting equipment analogous to a sale); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leas-
ing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 950-57, 428 S.W.2d 46, 50-54 (1968) (U.C.C. § 2-316(2) governing
exclusion or modification of warranties is applicable to a lease where the lease provisions are
analogous to a sale); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 445-46, 212
A.2d 769, 775-76 (1965) (implied warranties of sale at common law applicable to a lease). See
generally BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE, 3 SALES & BULK TRANSFERS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1.03[4], at 1-35 to 1-62 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
SALES & BULK TRANSFERS].
2
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determines the rights and obligations between the parties, 10 since
title is not necessarily related to those rights and obligations." The
diminishing consequences of whether a transaction is a sale or a lease
will be examined in the following areas of law: 1) implied warranties;
2) strict liability in tort; 3) the doctrine of unconscionability; 4) anti-
trust law; and 5) tax law. Before considering these legal conse-
quences, we will first examine some of the practical consequences of
buying or leasing a product from the viewpoint of the consumer.
II. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A PURCHASE VERSUS A LEASE
One who wishes to acquire tangible personal property must de-
cide whether to buy it or lease it.12  There are several advantages to
buying. A purchaser of a product receives an asset for his money,
rather than incurring an expense by leasing, and thereby improves
the appearance of his long term financial position on a balance
sheet.' 3 This permanent ownership of an asset gives the buyer an
"equity" or "residual" value in the product and the opportunity to
continue using it long -after it has been paid for.' 4 In addition, a
purchase acts as a hedge against inflation since it is made at current
prices. In contrast, when a lease expires, it costs more to replace or
release the product at future prices.' 5
There are, however, advantages to leasing. 16 Since leasing does
not require a large outlay of cash, working capital remains free for
other uses. 17 Additionally, in a true lease the freed working capital
10. See Comment, supra note 1, at 559. One commentator has stated that "[o]ne of the
most fundamental changes brought about by Article 2 was a decreased reliance on the concept
of title. Pre-Code law relied on the title theory, wherelby the location of title determined the
rights and duties of the parties." Id. (footnotes omitted).
11. See U.C.C. § 2-101, Comment. The official comment to § 2-101 states that "[tihe legal
consequences [of the contract for sale] are stated as following directly from the contract and
action taken under it without resorting to the idea of when property or title passed or was to
pass as being the determinative factor." Id. It would seem that those courts which apply sales
principles to leases because of the similarity between the lease and a sale accept this rationale.
12. See generally Symposium: Commercial Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 433 [hereinafter cited
as Commercial Leasing]; Symposium: Equipment Leasing, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 1 [hereinafter cited
as Equipment Leasing]. For a list of factors and problems which a party should be aware of
before entering into either type of transaction, see Meyers, A Worksheet for Leasing Equip-
ment, 23 PRAc. LAW. 59 (July 1977) [hereinafter cited as Leasing Worksheet]; Meyers, A Work-
sheet for Purchasing Complex and Expensive Equipment, 20 PRAC. LAW. 53 (Oct. 1974).
13. See Boothe, The Practical Pros and Cons of Leasing, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 3-4; Ed-
monds, An Introduction to Financial Statements for the Practicing Lawyer, 4 BLACK L.J. 196,
198, 201-04 (1975).
14. See Adkins & Bardos, The Leasing Transaction, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 16, 20; Boothe,
supra note 13, at 3-4.
15. See Shapiro, The ABC's of Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 433, 433.
16. See generally Commercial Leasing, supra note 12; Equipment Leasing, supra note 12.
17. See Dean, The Economics of Equipment Leasing, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 33, 47; Shapiro,
supra note 15, at 434. As one commentator has explained, a reason for choosing to lease is
[VOL. 24: p. 706
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improves the appearance of the short term financial position as indi-
cated on a balance sheet.' Leasing is also preferable when perma-
nent ownership is not desired, such as when a product is in a high
technology field and is likely to become obsolete quickly, 19 is subject
to frequently changing government regulations, or is likely to wear
out quickly or need constant repair. 20
To a company or individual experiencing a cash shortage, leasing
can be a particularly useful alternative to a purchase financed by a
loan. 2 1 In this situation, leasing has the additional advantages of con-
the lessee's feeling that he will be able to use the cash which is not expended for the item
to generate more than sufficient profits to offset the cost of leasing. If the lessee has
limited bank lines or is subject to lending restrictions imposed upon buying, he may be
prevented from purchasing the equipment. In either situation, leasing has the effect of
expanding the lessee's working capital.
Id. It has been argued, however, that although the desire to increase working capital may be a
major factor in the decisionmaking process, the increased profits resulting from the freed work-
ing capital are illusory. Boothe, supra note 13, at 4, 10.
18. See Wyatt, Accounting for Leases, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 497, 498-99. This improved finan-
cial position is due to the fact that lease payments do not appear as a liability on the balance
sheet, but instead are listed as an expense. Id. Two basic methods are used by accountants to
account for the various kinds of leases. Id. at 498. As one commentator has stated:
Accountants have come to classify leases for accounting purposes as either operating
leases or financing leases. Operating leases are those determined to be principally in the
nature of a "true" lease. The lessee is generally committing himself on a noncancellable
basis for a period less than the life of the property being leased. The lessor is generally
retaining significant rights in connection with the leased property so that when the lease
term expires he will have control of the property either for releasing or other disposition.
Under an operating lease the lessee recognizes the lease rental payments as an expense in
the period in which the property is used. The lessee may additionally disclose in a finan-
cial statement footnote the commitments existing at a balance sheet date for existing
leases. The lessor of an operating lease will recognize the lease rentals receivable in a
period as revenue and will charge against income depreciation on the leased property,
maintenance, and other related costs.
Id. at 498-99. The lessee in a finance or capital lease must record the present value of the
noncancellable lease commitment as an asset and a similar amount as a long term liability. Id. at
499. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently adopted a rule which sets
standards for the recordation of capital or nonoperating leases on financial statements.
17 C.F.R, § 2 10. 3 -1 6 (q) (1978). See also Accounting for Leases, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS:
ACCOUNTING (CCH) § 4053, at 8421 (1978). The source of this section is Financial Accounting
Standards Board, Statement No. 13. Id. The SEC incorporated this statement in promulgating
17 C.F.R. § 2 10. 3 -16 (q) (1978). 42 Fed. Reg. 44,807 (1977). Financial Accounting Standards
Board, Statement No. 13 has since been modified by Financial Accounting Standards Board,
Statements Nos. 27 and 28.
19. See Boothe, supra note 13, at 13; Davis, Tax Consequences of Leasing Transactions,
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 56, 57; Dean, supra note 17, at 37, Shapiro, supra note 15, at 433.
20. See Dean, supra note 17, at 37. The lessee can shift the burden of repair to the lessor.
Id.; Steadman, Chattel Leasing-A Vehicle for Capital Expansion, 14 Bus. LAW. 523, 527
(1959).
21. See Adkins & Bardos, supra note 14, at 18-19. A lease, unlike a purchase, does not
require a down payment and therefore does not immediately drain capital. Id. It has been
contended that in the long run leasing may be more expensive than purchasing since "the
leasing company not only must borrow its money, at comparable rates, but must also add suffi-
cient charges to cover the costs of purchasing the property, processing vendors' invoices, pre-
paring leases and allied documentation .... and, presumably, returning a profit to the lessor."
Boothe, supra note 13, at 6. This "blanket generalization" has been rejected by one commen-
tator who argues that "[t]he acid test is the quantitative comparison of each specific lease pro-
4
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serving credit, 22 of not depleting cash by requiring a down pay-
ment,2 3 and of not increasing the long term liabilities on the balance
sheet by adding a loan obligation. 24  Leasing is also advantageous
when the lessee desires other services provided by the leasing com-
pany, such as accounting or maintenance and repair.25 Since the les-
see's only expense is the rental payments, bookkeeping is
simplified.2 6
With consumer products, leasing instead of buying brings the
lessee within the scope of the Consumer Leasing Act of 1976 (Act).2 7
The Act affords protection to lessees who have entered a consumer
lease, which is defined as
a contract in the form of a lease or bailment for the use of personal
property by a natural person for a period of time exceeding four
months, and for a total contractual obligation not exceeding
$25,000, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,
whether or not the lessee has the option to purchase or other-
wise become the owner of 'he property at the expiration of the
lease .... 28
The Act, however, does not apply to leases for agricultural, business,
or commercial purposes, or a lease to an organization. 29 A lessor
entering a consumer lease is required by the Act to provide the les-
see with a dated written statement of the following information: a
description of the leased property; the amount of any advance pay-
ment, such as a security deposit; the number, amount, and due dates
of the periodic payments; other payments payable by the lessee;
other liabilities imposed on the lessee and whether or not he has the
option to purchase the leased property; all express warranties and
guarantees made by the manufacturer or lessor; insurance; and terms
and conditions of termination. 30
posal with the relevant ownership alternative." Dean, supra note 17, at 40. This commentator
indicates that the equipment user must do six things in order to decide whether to lease or to
purchase: "(1) forecast the use period of the equipment in question, (2) estimate annual lease
payments, (3) estimate ownership costs, (4) estimate net salvage or resale value, (5) adjust for
income taxes, and (6) find the capital worth of the stream of yearly cash cost differences be-
tween owning and leasing." Id. at 49.
22. See apiro, supra note 15, at 434.
23. Id. at 433-34. See also Adkins & Bardos, supra note 14, at 18-19.
24. For a discussion of how leases affect the lessee's balance sheet, see note 18 supra.
25. See Dean, supra note 17, at 44-46. By leasing, financing, marketing, repairing, and
record keeping functions can be transferred from the lessee to the lessor. Id. at 45. See note 20
supra.
26. See Wyatt, supra note 18, at 498-99.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667, 1667a-1667e (1976) (amending the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1601-1665a (1976)) (effective Mar. 23, 1977).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1667(1) (1976).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1667a.
[VOL. 24: p. 706
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In addition to these disclosure requirements, the Act restricts
penalties that may be imposed by the lessor. 3 ' When the lessee's
liability on expiration of the lease is based on the estimated residual
value of the property, the Act limits this liability to "a reasonable
approximation of the anticipated actual fair market value of the prop-
erty on lease expiration," 32 and provides for an independent profes-
sional appraisal of the property. 33 The Act also regulates claims
made in consumer lease advertising. 34
A purchase with some of the advantages of a lease can be made
by the use of a conditional or installment sale. 35 These transactions
usually require a down payment, however, and the conditional sale
obligation would also have to be carried as a liability on the balance
sheet. 36 Conversely, a lease with an option allowing the user or les-
see to buy the property at the end of the lease for a nominal price is
a lease with some of the advantages of a purchase. 37 This type of
lease-purchase arrangement may be treated as a conditional sale by
the Internal Revenue Service. 38
31. Id. § 1667b(b). This section provides:
Penalties or other charges for deliquency, default, or early termination may be
specified in the lease but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the antici-
pated or actual harm caused by the delinquency, default, or early termination, the dif-
ficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an
adequate remedy.
id.
32. Id. § 1667b(a).
33. Id. § 1667b(c).
34. Id. § 1667c.
35. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 22-3, at 759-65. An installment
sale in which the seller retains title to secure an obligation of the buyer to pay for the purchase
is subject to the requirements for secured transactions of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, U.C.C. art. 9. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 22-3, at 759-60. Article 9
applies "to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest
in personal property or fixtures." U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a). The distinction between a conditional
sale and a lease is often difficult to discern since transactions which are labelled leases fre-
quently are in fact nothing but disguised security transactions. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 2, § 22-3, at 759-65.
It has been suggested that the costs of leasing an item and of purchasing it with an install-
ment sale are almost equal. Adkins & Bardos, supra note 14, at 17. As these authors stated:
For practical purposes, then, the amounts paid by a lessee and received by a lessor
over the life of a lease of equipment (irrespective of optional renewals) will probably not
differ materially from the amount which would be paid and received if such equipment
were conditionally sold to the lessee. However, when the lease terminates, any residual
value, whether for scrap or for use, will be in the lessor, not in the lessee.
Id.
36. The purchased item would be classified as an asset and therefore the corresponding sale
obligation would have to be listed on the balance sheet. See generally B. FERST & S. FERST,
BASIc ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 68-73 (3d ed. 1975); Edmonds, supra note 13, at 198.
37. For factors relevant in determining whether to include an option to buy in a lease, see
Leasing Worksheet, supra note 12, at 63.
38. See notes 141-47 and accompanying text infra.
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All of these practical considerations become increasingly impor-
tant when deciding whether to lease or purchase because of the di-
minishing legal differences between a lease and a sale, which will
now be considered.
III. IMPLIED WARRANTIES
The two implied warranties of quality that the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (Code) recognizes in sales contracts are those of merchant-
ability 39 and fitness for a particular purpose. 40 Prior to the adoption
of the Code, warranties which were closely analogous to the Code's
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose had been extended to
bailments. 41 The warranties under the Code are now implied into
leases as well as sales, although the warranty of fitness has been more
widely accepted than the warranty of merchantability. 42
A. Implied Warranty of Fitness
The courts now imply the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose into nonsales contracts, particularly bailments for hire. 43 One
commentator has explained the reason for this extension as follows:
The expansion of enterprises' engaged solely in bailment for hire
seems to justify increasing imposition of absolute warranties, at
least to the extent that they would be imposed upon a seller of
similarly used goods. In addition, reliance is greater than in the
typical sale, for it is generally true that the bailee for hire spends
less time shopping for the article than he would in selecting like
39. U.C.C. § 2-314. This section provides in pertinent part: "Unless excluded or modified
(Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." Id.§ 2-314(1).
40. Id. § 2-315. This section provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on tile seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified tinder
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
Id. For a discussion of how other sections of article 2 of the Code, U.C.C art. 2, have been
applied to lease transactions, see Comment, supra note 1, at 556-73.
41. See, e.g., Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 272 P.2d 26 (1954) (horses); Hoisting
Engine Sales Co. v. Hart, 237 N.Y. 30, 142 N.E. 342 (1923) (derrick); Dufort v. Smith, 53 Pa.
D. & C. 307 (Luzerne County C.P. 1944) (airplane); Hilton v. Wagner, 10 Tenn. App. 173
(1928) (automobile). See generally Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 655-60.
42. See Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 655-57; Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447, 449-54 (1971).
43. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 950-57, 428 S.W.2d 46, 50-54
(1968); Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc. 2d
226, 231, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 398 (1969). See 3 SALES & BULK TRANSFERS, supra note 9, § 1.03
[4]a, at 1-37 to 1-50; Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 655-57; Murray, supra note 42, at 449-54.
See also Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 668 (1973); Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 850 (1959).
[VOL. 24: p. 706
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goods to be purchased, and since the item is not one he expects to
own, he will usually be less competent in judging its quality. 4
Some courts have held that, as with a sale, only a lease by a
merchant of the goods transferred would have the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose. 4 5  The policy considerations that jus-
tify the imposition of warranties in both sales and leases by merchants
include
(a) public policy which requires that the party which puts goods
into the stream of commerce should bear the risk of harm caused
by defective goods, rather than the person injured by it; (b) the
fact that one party has induced the reliance of the consumer on his
skill and knowledge; (c) the fact that the former is in a better posi-
tion to control the antecedents which affect the quality of the
product; and (d) the fact that he is better able to distribute the
loss. 4 6
The extension of warranty protection to leases of tangible per-
sonal property has been acknowledged by the drafters of the Code in
an official comment, which states that "the warranty sections of this
Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law
growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined
... to sales contracts . . . .They may arise in other appropriate cir-
cumstances such as in the case of bailments for hire .... "47
44. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 673-74. See also Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 446-47, 212 A.2d 769, 775-76 (1965). Discussing whether warranties should
be applied to leases, the Supreme Court of Idaho has stated that "[t]he essence of both transac-
tions is that the lessee/buyer seeks to acquire the right to use a good and the lessor/seller seeks
to sell the right to use a good." Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216,
222, 541 P.2d 1184, 1190 (1975).
45. See W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970).
Although the warranty of fitness will not apply to all lease transactions, the Supreme Court of
Florida reasoned that it should be recognized when appropriate. id. The court stated:
Just as in sales cases, whether the warranty should be applied may depend upon whether
the lessor possessed or should have possessed expertise in the characteristics of the leased
chattel, whether the lessee's reliance upon the lessor's selection of a suitable chattel was
commercially reasonable, and whether the lessor was a mass dealer in the chattel leased
or whether the transaction was an isolated occurrence.
Id. See also Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 225, 541 P.2d 1184,
1193 (1975) (implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose arise
because lessor was a merchant and lessee relied on merchant's expertise).
46. Commentary, The Extension of Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions, 10 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 127, 140-41 (1968). Although this statement suggests that the necessity
of implying a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is most compelling where the lessor is
a merchant, the lessor's status should not be controlling. Id. at 141-42.
Under the Code, a seller does not necessarily have to be a merchant in the goods supplied
for an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose to apply. U.C.C. § 2-315. An official
comment to this section states: "'Although normally the warranty will arise only where the seller
is a merchant with the appropriate 'skill or judgment,' it can arise as to non-merchants when
this is justified by the particular circumstances." Id., Comment 4.
47. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2. The Supreme Court of Idaho listed three possible
rationales for finding the implied warranty provisions of article 2 of the Code, id. art. 2, appli-
8
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This trend of applying sales warranties to leases has not been
confined to transactions in personal property, but has also been ex-
tended to transactions in real property as well, particularly residential
realty. 48 Courts have found an implied warranty of fitness in con-
tracts of sale for new houses. 49 As stated in one federal case involv-
ing the presence of dangerous lead based paint in a house sold by the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development:
The [United States] Supreme Court has long held that the law
will imply a warranty of fitness for the purpose intended when a
buyer has reason to rely on, and does rely on, the judgment of the
seller who produces the product, especially, as to latent de-
fects .... The application of this principle in the field of housing
has resulted in the declaration of an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity to exist between a builder-vendor of a new home and the
purchaser thereof.5 0
This warranty of habitability has been implied into residential
leases as well as residential sales. 5' The rationale for the implication
of this warranty is the similarity between the lease and sale transac-
tions, 52 which was also the rationale for finding a warranty of fitness
in the lease of personal property. 53 As the United States Court of
cable to a lease: 1) a lease was within the scope of article 2 since it was a transaction in goods;
2) a specific lease was analogous to a sale of goods since it was actually a "disguised sale' and
therefore the lease was subject to article 2; and 3) the economic considerations involved in
leasing and selling were so similar that certain provisions of article 2 were applicable by analogy
to lease transactions. Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 220-21, 541
P.2d 1184, 1188-89 (1975). For a general discussion of the applicability of Code warranties to
bailments for hire, see Murray, supra note 42, at 449-54. See also Annot., 48 A. L.R.3d 668, 674
(1973).
48. See Murray, supra note 42, at 454-65. See also 3 SALES & BULK TRANSFERS, supra note
9, § 1.03[4], at 1-44 to 1-47 (construction contracts).
49. See, e.g., Peterson v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 I11. 2d 31, 39-40, 389 N.E.2d 1154,
1159 (1979); McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, -, 398 A.2d 1283, 1292 (1979); Elderkin v.
Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 124-30, 288 A.2d 771, 775-77 (1972). For a discussion of the application of
the doctrine of caveat emptor to the sale of houses, see McNamara, The Implied Warranty in
New-House Construction: Has the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor Been Abolished?, 1 REAL EST.
L.J. 43 (1973); Murray, supra note 42, at 454-59.
50. City of Philadelphia v. Page, 363 F. Supp. 148, 151 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (citations omitted),
motion to vacate order denied, 373 F.Supp. 453 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
51. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-81 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 251-52 (1971);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970)); Park Hill Terrace Associates v.
Glennon, 146 N.J. Super. 271, 277, 369 A.2d 938, 942 (1977); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Valez,
73 Misc. 2d 996, 999, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973); Fair v. Negley, - Pa.
Super. Ct. -, 390 A.2d 240, 242-43 (1978); Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 87, 384 A.2d
1234, 1236 (1978). For a discussion of the development of implied warranties of habitability in
residential leases, see line, Implied Warranties of Habitability and Fitness for Intended Use in
Urban Residential Leases, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 161 (1974); Moreno, The Warranty of Unin-
habitability, 7 SAN FERN. V. L. REv. 67 (1978); Murray, supra note 42, at 459-64. See also
Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 646 (1971).
52. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
53. See notes 44, 46 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated in the leading case
of Javins v. First National Realty Corp.:54
The rigid doctrines of real property law have tended to inhibit
the application of implied warranties to transactions involving real
estate. Now, however, courts have begun to hold sellers and de-
velopers of real property responsible for the quality of their
product....
Despite this trend in the sale of real estate, many courts have
been unwilling to imply warranties of quality, specifically a war-
ranty of habitability, into leases of apartments. Recent decisions
have offered no convincing explanation for their refusal; rather they
have relied without discussion upon the old common law rule that
the lessor is not obligated to repair unless he covenants to do so in
the written lease contract .... In our judgment, the old no-repair
rule cannot coexist with the obligations imposed on the landlord by
a typical modem housing code, and must be abandoned in favor of
an implied warranty of habitability. 55
B. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
As previously stated, the implied warranty of fitness has been
more widely incorporated into leases of tangible personal property
than has the implied warranty of merchantability. 56  Where a product
was unfit for its common use, the tendency has been to consider
whether it was fit for the particular use of the lessee and not whether
it conformed "to a standard of 'bailability' analogous to that of mer-
chantability." 57 This tendency has been changing, however, and
54. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). The landlord in Javins
sought possession of premises leased to the appellants on the grounds that the tenants had
defaulted on rental payments. 428 F.2d at 1073. The tenants admitted that they had not paid
the rent, but alleged as a defense that numerous violations of the District of Columbia housing
regulations entitled them to a set-off. Id. The court held that "a warranty of habitability, mea-
sured by the standards set out in the Housing Regulations for the District of Columbia, is
implied by operation of law into leases of urban dwelling units .. . and that breach of this
warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of contract." Id. at 1072-73.
55. 428 F.2d at 1076-77 (footnotes omitted). Judge Skelly Wright's opinion in Javins, in the
words of one commentator, "denounced this blind adherence to and application of the'old rules
and discarded the archaic property principles as they applied to the modern landlord-tenant
relationships." Moreno, supra note 51, at 69.
56. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
57. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 657 (footnote omitted). See Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 668, 673
(1973). The implied warranty of merchantability for sales is codified in U.C.C. § 2-314. Id.§
2-314. The Code lists six factors to be examined in determining whether a good is merchant-
able:
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description;
and
10
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some courts are more willing to hold that leases contain both warran-
ties. 58  In Javins, for example, the D.C. Circuit observed that
"[c]ourts have not hesitated to find implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability." '9 Similarly, in a case involing the lease of a
"U-Haul" trailer, a Pennsylvania lower court stated somewhat exuber-
antly that "the authorities are uniform in holding that the implied
warranty arises in the case of a lease as freely as in the case of a
sale." 60
This erosion of the distinction between an implied warranty of
merchantability and one of fitness for an intended use is rational since
most of the same public policy considerations apply to both warran-
ties. A merchant who places property into the stream of commerce
should bear the risk of harm caused by defects since he is better able
to control its quality and distribute the loss, and to some extent has
induced the public to rely on his skill and knowledge. 61 There is no
reason why only one type of warranty should be implied into a lease.
C. Disclaimer of Implied Warranties
The disclaimer provisions of the Code specify and limit the man-
ner in which the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability can
be excluded or modified. 62 To effectively exclude or modify the im-
plied warranty of merchantability, "the language must mention mer-
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require;
and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if
any.
Id. § 2-314(2). For a discussion of the implied warranty of merchantability under tihe Code, see,
e.g., R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 231-38 (1970); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 2, §§ 9-6 to 9-8, at 286-96; Courts in examining lease transactions for warran-
ties sometimes speak in terms of fitness for an intended purpose, which the Code addresses in
U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c). See, e.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434,
446, 212 A.2d 769, 775 (1965); Henry v. Hostetler, 16 Bucks 74, 75 (Pa. C.P. 1966), reprinted
in [1967] 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 614, 615.
58. See, e.g., Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, 393-94, 215 S.E.2d
10, 18-19 (1975) (Code warranty provisions applicable to leases which are analogous to a sale);
Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 225, 541 P.2d 1184, 1193 (1975)
(express warranty provisions of Code extended to a lease); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing &
Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 452, 212 A.2d 769, 778-79 (1965) (warranty of fitness for use implied
into lease of a truck).
59. 428 F.2d at 1075-76.
60. Henry v. Hostetler, 16 Bucks 74, 75 (Pa. C.P. 1966) (citations omitted), reprinted in
[1967] 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 614, 615.
61. See Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 655; Commentary, supra note 46, at 134; Comment,
supra note 1, at 562. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
62. U.C.C. § 2-316.
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chantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the language must
be by a writing and conspicuous." 63 Courts have held that this pro-
vision applies to disclaimers in leases to the same extent as to dis-
claimers in sales contracts. 64 The requirements of this provision of
the Code must therefore be met to exclude or modify an implied
warranty in a lease of tangible personal property.
IV. STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
There is also a diminishing difference between sales and leases in
the area of strict liability in tort for injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts. 65 An outgrowth of the implied warranties already discussed, 66
this theory of products liability is a combination of warranty and tort
concepts. 67 Originally applicable only to sales, principles of products
liability have been extended to leases in which the lessor is a mer-
chant of goods. 68 As the California Supreme Court stated, in a lead-
ing case involving a fuel truck which was leased to plaintiff's
employer:
[W]e can perceive no substantial difference between sellers of per-
sonal property and non-sellers, such as bailors and lessors. In each
63. ld. § 2-316(2).
64. See, e.g., Quality Acceptance Corp. v Million & Albers, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 771, 773-74
(D. Wyo. 1973); KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Electronics Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315, 325-26 (W.D.
Ark. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 465 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1972)' See also Annot., 48
A.L.R.3d 668, 679-80 (1973).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For a general discussion of prod-
ucts liability, see W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 641-82 (4th ed. 1971). When a lease is an
isolated transaction, however, strict liability will not apply. See, e.g., Lina v. Rossville Packing
Co., 54 I11. App. 3d 290, 292-93, 369 N.E.2d 612, 614 (1977); Nastasi v. Hochman, 58 A.D.2d
564, 564, 396 N.Y.S.2d 216, 217-18 (1977).
66. See notes 39-64 and accompanying text supra. The possible defenses to a warranty
action, such as a valid disclaimer tinder U.C.C. § 2-316 or lack of privity under U.C.C. § 2-318,
often make recovery for defective products difficult. See W. PROSSER, supra note 65, at 655-56.
For a discussion of the defenses available to the seller/lessor of goods under the Code, see J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, §§ 11-1 to 12-12, at 326-96. In discussing the relationship
of strict liability to warranty, Prosser has stated that "it gradually became apparent that 'war-
ranty,' as a device for justification of strict liability to the consumer, carries far too much lug-
gage in the way of undesirable complications, and is more trouble than it is worth." W.
PROSSER, supra note 65, at 656.
67. See Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 731, 497 P.2d 732, 733 (1972). "Because of the
shortcomings of the early theories, the courts developed a third theory of recovery which com-
bined the strict liability of warranty with the broad reach of negligence. This theory is known as
strict liability in tort and has been applied throughout the country to products liability cases."
id.
68. See, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 253, 466 P.2d 722, 727, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178, 183 (1970); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 452-53, 212 A.2d
769, 778-81 (1965); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 735, 497 P.2d 732, 737 (1972); Nath v.
National Equip. Leasing Corp., 473 Pa. 178, 180, 373 A.2d 1105, 1106 (1977) (per curiam);
Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 369, 372 A.2d 736, 739 (1977). See also An-
not., 52 A.L.R.3d 121 (1973).
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instance, the seller or non-seller "places [an article] on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects ...."
... In the light of the policy to be subserved, it should make no
difference that the party distributing the article has retained title to
it. Nor can we see how the risk of harm associated with the use of
the chattel can vary with the legal form under which it is held.
Having in mind the market realities and the widespread use of the
lease of personalty in today's business world, we think it makes
good sense to impose on the lessors of chattels the same liability
for physical harm which has been imposed on the manufacturers
and retailers....
For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the doctrine
of strict liability in tort should be made applicable to bailors and
lessors of personal property in the same manner as we have held it
applicable to sellers of such property .... [W]e can find no sig-
nificant difference between a manufacturer or retailer who places
an article on the market by means of a sale and a bailor or lessor
who accomplishes the same result by means of a lease.6 9
The decision to impose strict liability on the supplier of tangible
personal property should not depend on whether title passes to the
recipient, i.e., whether the transaction is a lease or a sale. 70 Impos-
ing liability on the basis of title alone would disregard the policy basis
for strict liability that a person in the business of supplying products
must assume a special responsibility toward the consuming public. 71
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently stated: "What is crucial to
the rule of strict liability is not the means of marketing but rather the
fact of marketing, whether by sale, lease or bailment, for use and
consumption by the public." 72
69. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251-53, 466 P.2d 722, 726-27, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178,
182-83 (1970) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original), quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963). In Price, plaintiff's
employer leased a gasoline tank truck with a ladder from the defendant in 1958. 2 Cal. 3d at
248, 466 P.2d at 723, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 179. The defendant lessor replaced the ladder at the
employer's request and both parties inspected the installation. Id. at 248, 466 P.2d at 723-24,
85 Cal. Rptr. at 179-80. The plaintiff, who was injured when the ladder split into segments,
brought an action against the lessor alleging negligence and breach of warranty. Id. at 248-49,
466 P.2d at 724, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 180. Nonsuiting these allegations, the trial court on its own
motion then submitted the case to the jury on a theory of strict liability in tort. Id. at 249, 466
P.2d at 724, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
70. See 2 Cal. 3d at 253, 466 P.2d at 727, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
71. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963). In Greenman, Justice Traynor stated that "[tihe purpose of such
liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves.'" Id.
72. Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 367, 372 A.2d 736, 738 (1977).
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For the same reasons that implied warranties may arise from
both sales and leases, 73 strict liability may also arise from sales and
leases since the consumer or user needs protection against product
failure whether he buys or leases the item.
V. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
The doctrine of unconscionability under'the Code 7a is much
broader than at common law, where a contract was unconscionable if
it was "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept
on the other." 75  In contrast, under the Code:
The basic test [of unconscionability] is whether, in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the
particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to
be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of
the making of the contract .... The principle is one of the preven-
tion of oppression and unfair surprise . . . and not of disturbance of
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.
76
Although article 2 of the Code 77 was enacted to cover sales, 78
the Code provisions on unconscionability have been applied to
nonsales transactions including leases. 79 This is consistent with the
73. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
74. U.C.C. § 2-302. This Code section on unconscionable contracts or clauses provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the con-
tract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause,
or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscion-
able result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may
be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evi-
dence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
Id. See also id. § 2-316(1) (words or conduct negating express warranty are inoperative to the
extent that such construction is unreasonable); id. § 2-718(1) (provisions fixing unreasonably
large liquidated damages are void as penalties); id. § 2-719(3) (consequential damages may be
limited or excluded unless unconscionable; limitation of consequential damages for personal in-
jury is prima facie unconscionable but limitation to commercial loss is not). For related concepts
in article 1 of the Code, id. art. 1, see id. § 1-102(3) (obligations of good faith, diligence, and
care imposed by the Code may not be disclaimed by agreement); id. § 1-203 (obligation of good
faith in performance or enforcement imposed on every contract or duty in the Code).
75. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Vesey Sr. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750).
See also Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889); Mandel v. Leibman, 303 N.Y. 88,
94, 100 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1951). For a discussion of the common law doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity, see J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 318-22 (2d ed. 1977).
76. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1 (citation omitted).
77. Id. art. 2.
78. See Comment, supra note 1, at 559.
79. See, e.g., Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Convalescent Home of the First Church of De-
liverance, 49 111. App. 3d 213, 220, 365 N.E.2d 1285, 1290 (1977) (in equipment lease analogous
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general provisions of the Code which, by their own terms, encourage
the modernization and expansion of commercial law.80 Moreover,
this broadened application is consistent with certain specific provi-
sions of article 2 which indicate that many of its principles apply to
nonsales transactions as well as sales. 8 '
A recent New York decision, Industralease Automated & Scien-
tific Equipment Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc.,8 2 applied these
principles of article 2 to a lease of industrial equipment.8 3 In Indus-
tralease, the owners of a picnic grove entered into a lease-purchase
arrangement for two incinerators which failed to work.8 4 The lease,
which disclaimed all warranties, required the rent to be paid whether
the incinerators worked or not.8 5 Although the disclaimer satisfied
the requirements necessary to exclude warranties under section 2-316
of the Code,8 6 the court held that the lease was nevertheless subject
to invalidation for unconscionability.8 7 The court further held that
the disclaimer was in fact unconscionable because: 1) the owners
were not familiar with the operating characteristics of the in-
cinerators; 2) the disclaimer of warranties was in a second lease,
which was substituted for a prior lease with warranties shortly before
the incinerators were to be installed and was represented to the les-
see as being necessary to assure timely delivery of the incinerators;
and 3) the incinerators never worked. 8 Since this was a commercial
lease of business equipment and not a lease of consumer goods, a
to a sale, U.C.C. § 2-302 is controlling in detemining if a clause in the lease is unconscionable);
Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 58 A.D.2d
482, 487-90, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 430-32 (1977) (disclaimer of warranty in an industrial lease held
unconscionable); United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apartments, Inc., 65 Misc. 2d
1082, 1086, 319 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971) (a lease which in substance was an installment
sale held unconscionable). See also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 75, at 322; 3 SALES
& BULK TRANSFERS, supra note 9, at 1-52; Murray, supra note 42, at 452; Comment, supra
note 1, at 563.
80. See U.C.C. § 1-102; id., Comment 1. See also Commentary, supra note 46, at 139-40;
Comment, supra note 1, at 567-70.
81. See U.C.C. § 2-102. This section provides that "[u]nless the context otherwise requires,
this Article applies to transactions in goods." Id. Unlike U.C.C. § 2-314 and U.C.C § 2-315,
which are worded in terms of sales, see notes 39-61 and accompanying text supra, the Code
provision on unconscionability makes no reference to sales, buyers, or sellers. See U.C.C.
§ 2-302. For the text of § 2-302, see note 74 supra. Since there are no express limitations on the
scope of the unconscionability provision, it is submitted that § 2-302 could be applied to those
lease transactions which are within the meaning of "transactions in goods." See R. NORDSTROM,
supra note 57, at 41-44; 3 SALES & BULK TRANSFERS, supra note 9, at 1-35 to 1-62.
82. 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977).
83. Id. at 486-87, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 429-30.
84. Id. at 483, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
85. Id.
86. U.C.C. § 2-316. For the text of this section, see note 74 supra.
87. 58 A.D.2d at 487, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
88. Id. at 489-90, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 432. The Industralease court concluded that giving effect
to the disclaimer would be "a result so 'one-sided' . .. that the disclaimer in good conscience
should not be enforced." Id. at 490, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 432 (footnote omitted).
15
Abrams: The Diminishing Difference between Selling and Leasing Tangible P
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979
1978-1979] SELLING AND LEASING PERSONAL PROPERTY 721
possible bias in favor of consumers was not present.8 9 The transac-
tion also did not involve personal injury, which eliminates a possible
prejudice in favor of injured parties. 90 Accordingly, Industralease
demonstrates a court's willingness to expand the reach of the Code's
doctrine of unconscionability even to purely commercial situations
where tangible personal property is leased as well as sold.
VI. ANTITRUST LAW
In a recent case, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 91
the Supreme Court of the United States overruled its decision in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. ,92 which had attached great
antitrust consequences to the difference between sales and bailments
of tangible personal property. 93 The Schwinn Court held that if a
manufacturer parted with title, dominion, and risk of loss with re-
spect to products sold to its distributors and retailers, then it was
illegal per se for the manufacturer to seek to restrict or control either
the territorial areas where the distributors and retailers could sell the
products or the customers to whom they could sell. 94 If the man-
89. See id. at 489, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 431. See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 4-3, at
118-19.
90. See 58 A.D.2d at 489, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
91. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
92. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), The Government brought a civil antitrust suit against Arnold,
Schwinn & Company (Schwinn) alleging a conspiracy to fix prices, to allocate exclusive ter-
ritories to wholesalers, and to restrict merchandise to franchised dealers in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 388 U.S. at 367. Schwinn had three principal methods
of selling its bicycles: 1) sales to distributors; 2) sales to retailers by consignment or agency
arrangement with distributors; and 3) sales to retailers by the Schwinn Plan where the dis-
tributor took the order, Schwinn shipped directly to the retailer and then invoiced the dealer
and paid the distributor a commission for taking the order. Id. at 370. Schwinn assigned specific
territories to its distributors who "were instructed to sell only to franchised Schwinn accounts
and only in their respective territories which were specifically described and allocated on an
exclusive basis." Id. at 371. Schwinn's franchised retailers were prohibited from selling to any-
one other than consumers. Id. at 372. The district court held that Schwinn's territorial limita-
tion agreements with the distributors were per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act although
its decision was limited to transactions where the distributor purchased the bicycles from
Schwinn. id. at 376. The court held that Schwinn was free to make territorial restrictions when
the transaction involved consignment, agency, or the Schwinn Plan. Id. The Government ap-
pealed, arguing, inter alia that "the decree should not be confined to sale transactions between
Schwinn and wholesalers but should reach territorial restrictions upon distributors whether they
are incident to sale and resale transactions or to consignment, agency or Schwinn-Plan relation-
ship between Schwinn and the distributors." Id. at 377 (emphasis in original).
93. 388 U.S. at 379-80.
94. Id. at 379. The Supreme Court stated:
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to
restrict and confine areas or persons with which an article may be traded after the man-
ufacturer has parted with dominion over it .... Such restraints are so obviously destruc-
tive of competition that their mere existence is enough. If the manufacturer parts with
16
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ufacturer retained title, dominion, and risk of loss, however, then
such conduct was not per se unreasonable, but was to be judged by
the rule of reason to determine whether or not it was illegal.95 The
Schwinn doctrine was subsequently summarized by the Continental
T.V. Court as follows: "The pivotal factor was the passage of title: All
restrictions were held to be per se illegal where title had passed, and
all were evaluated and sustained under the rule of reason where it
had not." 96
The Supreme Court's Continental T.V. decision swept aside this
artificial distinction, concluding "that the distinction drawn in
Schwinn between sale and nonsale transactions is not sufficient to jus-
tify the application of a per se rule in one situation and a rule of
reason in the other." 9 7 The Court then held that both types of
transactions should be judged under the rule of reason. 98
Although neither Schwinn nor Continental T.V. dealt specifically
with leases, the broad language used by the Supreme Court and the
rationale underlying its decisions suggest that the rule of reason test
dominion over his product or transfers risk of loss to another, he may not reserve control
over its destiny or the conditions of its resale.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
95. Id. at 380. As the Schwinn Court explained:
Where the manufacturer retains title, dominion, and risk with respect to the product and
the position and function of the dealer in question are, in fact, indistinguishable from
those of an agent or salesman of the manufacturer, it is only if the impact of the confine-
ment is "unreasonably" restrictive of competition that a violation of § 1 results from such
confinement, unencumbered by culpable price fixing.
Id. (citation omitted).
96. 433 U.S. at 52. In an attempt to improve its market share, GTE Sylvania Inc. (Sylvania)
eliminated its wholesale distributors and sold directly to a limited number of franchisees who
were required to sell Sylvania products only from the franchised location. Id. at 38. As a result
of a dispute with Continental T.V., Inc., (Continental), one of its retail franchisees, Sylvania
cancelled the franchise and its finance company brought suit to recover money owed and mer-
chandise held by Continental. Id. at 40. Continental claimed that Sylvania's franchise agree-
ments prohibiting the sale of Sylvania products other than from specified locations violated § 1
of the Sheran Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 433 U.S. at 40. The trial judge instructed the jury
according to the per se standard enunciated in Schwinn. Id. at 40-41. The jury found that
Sylvania had violated antitrust laws and awarded damages to Continental. Id. at 41. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Schwinn was distin-
guishable and that the franchise agreement should have been judged under the rule of reason.
Id.
The Supreme Court found that "[i]n intent and competitive impact, the retail customer
restriction in Schwinn is indistinguishable from the location restriction in the present case." Id.
at 46. The Court, however, agreed to reconsider the per se rule stated in Schwinn. Id. at 47.
97. 433 U.S. at 57. The Court stated that "[tihe market impact of vertical restrictions is
complex because of their potential for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and
stimulation of interbrand competition" and "that this distinction [in Schwinn] between sale and
nonsale transactions resulted from the Court's effort to accommodate the perceived intrabrand
harm and interbrand benefit of vertical restrictions." Id. at 51-52 (footnotes omitted). The Court
acknowledged that there was "substantial scholarly and judicial authority" supporting the
economic utility of vertical restrictions. Id. at 57-58. Since the possible benefits to interbrand
competition could not be evaluated when the Schwinn per se rule was applied to vertical re-
strictions, that decision had to be overruled and the rule of reason restored. Id.
98. Id. at 57. The Continental T.V. Court reasoned: "When anticompetitive effects are
17
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for violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act 99 would apply equally
to leases and to sales. 100 Antitrust law thus further illustrates the
diminishing consequences of whether a transaction is a sale or a lease.
VII. TAX LAW
The difference in the overall tax consequences of whether a
transaction is a sale or a lease is also diminishing. It is important to
note that this discussion extends only to sale and lease transactions
that are intended to acquire property from someone else who already
owns the property and not sale and leaseback situations.'10 Although
a detailed discussion of tax law is beyond the scope of this article, a
general survey of the tax differences between sales and leases is pre-
shown to result from particular vertical restrictions they can be adequately policed under the
rule of reason, the standard traditionally applied for the majority of anticompetitive practices
challenged under § 1 of the Act." Id. at 59.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
100. See notes 94-98 and accompanying text supra.
101. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). In Frank Lyon, Worthen
Bank & Trust Company (Worthen) wanted to construct a building for its use but was prevented
by state and federal regulations from obtaining conventional financing. Id. at 563-64. Worthen
entered into a sale and leaseback agreement with Frank Lyon Company (Lyon) by which Lyon
took title to the building, obtained a construction loan and permanent mortgage financing, and
leased the building back to the bank for long term use. Id. at 565-66. Pursuant to this agree-
ment, Worthen was obligated to pay rent equal to Lyon's principal and interest payments and
Worthen had an option to repurchase the building at various times. Id. at 566-67.
After the building was completed and Worthen took possession, Lyon filed an income tax
return which accrued the rent as income and deducted depreciation, interest, and related pay-
ments. Id. at 568. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions claiming
that the transaction was a sham and assessed a deficiency which Lyon paid. Id. at 568-69. Lyon
brought suit to recover the amount paid. Id. at 569. Although the district court allowed recov-
ery, the judgment was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Id. at 569-70.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit and con-
cluded that Lyon was entitled to the deductions. Id. at 583-84. The Court explained:
In short, we hold that where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction
with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory
realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-
avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Government should honor
the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties. Expressed another way, so
long as the lessor retains significant and genuine attributes of the traditional lessor status,
the form of the transaction adopted by the parties governs for tax purposes. What those
attributes are in any particular case will necessarily depend upon its facts. It suffices to
say that, as here, a sale-and-leaseback, in and of itself, does not necessarily operate to
deny a taxpayer's claim for deductions.
Id. at 583-84 (footnote omitted).
Although this decision upholds the asserted distinctions between a sale and a lease, it also
demonstrates the Supreme Court's commitment to a case-by-case evaluation to determine
whether the substance of a transaction is evident in the form of the agreement. As the Frank
Lyon Court noted, "the characterization of a transaction for financial accounting purposes, on
the one hand, and for tax purposes, on the other, need not necessarily be the same." Id. at 577
(citations omitted). See also Shapiro, supra note 15, at 433, 438-40, 438 n.5.
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sented from the viewpoint of the user wishing to acquire the property
and from the viewpoint of the supplier of the property. 10 2
A. Acquiring the Property
One who purchases tangible personal property for use in a trade
or business or for the production of income makes a capital expendi-
ture, and the depreciation on that property is tax deductible. 10 3 The
purchaser is also entitled to any applicable investment credit. 10 4 If
he borrows to finance the purchase, the interest on the loan is also
deductible. 105  If the purchase is financed by an installment sale con-
tract, then the portion of each installment payment which represents
imputed interest is deductible.' 0 6 If the property is leased rather
than bought, the rental payments are deductible, 10 7 but depreciation
is not. 108
In deciding the method by which to acquire property, one must
compare the depreciation and interest deductions available to a
102. See generally Gallagher, Tax Consequences of a Leveraged Lease Transaction, 52 TAXES
356 (1974); Landis, Tax Aspects of Leasing, 79 COM. L.J. 8 (1974); Lefevre, The Tax Law of
Lease Transactions Revisited, 53 TAXES 765 (1975); Morris, Taxation of Leases: Profits and
Pitfalls, 30 Sw. L.J. 435 (1976); Schmidt & Larsen, Leveraged lease arrangements: Tax factors
that contribute to their attractiveness, 41 J. TAX. 210 (1974). For a discussion of equipment
leasing as a tax shelter and its treatment tinder the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, see Wiesner, Tax Shelters-A Survey of the Impact of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, 33 TAX L. REV. 5, 69-78 (1977). See also TAX MNGM'T (BNA) No. 12-5th (1978).
103. I.R.C. § 167(a). The general rule on depreciation is as follows: "There shall be allowed
as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including
a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)-(1) of property used in the trade or business, or (2) of
property held for the production of income." Id.
104. Id. §§ 38, 46-50.
105. Id. § 163(a).
106. Id. §§ 163(b), 483. See also Commissioner v. Wilshire Holding Corp., 288 F.2d 799 (9th
Cir. 1960) (taxpayer is entitled to apportion interest and principal payments for federal income
tax purposes).
107. I.R.C. § 16 2 (a)(3). This section states in relevant part that a taxpayer is entitled to a
deduction for "rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued
use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has
not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity." Id.
108. Id. § 167. Only those capital improvements made by the lessee on the lessor's prop-
erty are deductible by him. Id. § 178. See Treas. Reg. § 1.178-1 to -3 (1960). Treas. Reg.
§ 1.167(a)-4, T.D. 6520, 1961-1 C.B. 52, 62, provides in part:
Capital expenditures made by a lessee for the erection of buildings or the construc-
tion of other permanent improvements on leased property are recoverable through
allowances for depreciation or amortization. If the useful life of such improvements in the
hands of the taxpayer is equal to or shorter than the remaining period of the lease, the
allowances shall take the form of depreciation under section 167 . . . . If, on the other
hand, the estimated useful life of such property in the hands of taxpayer, determined
without regard to the terms of the lease, would be longer than the remaining period of
such lease, the allowances shall take the form of annual deductions from gross income in
an amount equal to the unrecovered cost of such capital expenditures divided by the
number of years remaining of the term of the lease. Such deductions shall be in lieu of
allowances for depreciation.
Id. See also Davis, supra note 19, at 59.
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purchaser with the rental deductions available to the lessee. 10 9 This
analysis depends upon the relative lengths of the depreciable life of
the property and the term of the lease, 110 and the method of depre-
ciation used."' If the useful economic life of the asset is longer than
the lease, then the lease provides a shorter write off period for tax
purposes. 112 Although the timing of the tax payments may vary,
there is often little difference in the total tax payable under a sale or
a lease, since the total purchase price of the asset, including financ-
ing, usually approximates the total rental due on a lease. 113 The total
depreciation and interest deductions, therefore, approximate the total
rental deductions. "14
Similarly, there is a diminishing difference between the effect of
the investment credit in a purchase as compared with its effect in a
lease." 5  As indicated, a purchaser can use the investment credit if
applicable, 116 but a lessee can also use the credit under certain cir-
cumstances. 117  A lessor, other than certain persons," 8 of most tan-
gible personal property '" produced or acquired after December 31,
1961,120 can elect to treat the lease as an acquisition by the lessee,
and therefore the lessee may be entitled to claim the investment
credit. 121 A sublessor can similarly make this election to pass
through the investment credit to its sublessee. 122 In order for the
lessee to claim the credit, the property must meet the above qualifi-
cations in the hands of the lessee as well as of the lessor. 123 For the
109. See Lefevre, supra note 102, at 766.
110. Id. See Davis, supra note 19, at 56-57.
111. See I.R.C. § 167(b).
112. Id. §§ 162(a)(3), 167. See Dean, supra note 17, at 39.
113. See Lefevre, supra note 102, at 772-73. See also Boothe, supra note 13, at 3; Dean,
supra note 17, at 39.
114. This might not be true, however, for users subject to the minimum tax in I.R.C.
§ 55-58.
115. See ].R.C. § 38. This section provides a tax credit for investment in certain depreciable
property. Id. Section 46 of the Internal Revenue Code, id. § 46, governs the amount of the
credit which can be claimed under § 38. Id. § 46(a). Section 48 of the Internal Revenue Code,
id. § 48, supplies the definitions and rules for § 38 property. Id.
116. Id. §§ 38, 46-50.
117. Id. § 48(d). See generally TAx MNGM'T (BNA) No. 12-5th, at A-11 to A-22 (1978).
118. I.R.C. § 48(d)(1). Those persons who are not eligible for the investment tax credit are
described in § 46(e)(1) of' the Internal Revenue Code, id. § 46(e)(1). They include: 1) those
mutual savings banks, cooperative banks, and domestic building and loan associations to which
I.R.C. § 593 applies; 2) regulated investment companies or real estate investment trusts subject
to taxation under subchapter M, id. §§ 851-860; and 3) cooperative organizations described in
I.R.C. § 1381(a). Id. § 46(e)(1).
119. Id. § 48(a).
120. Id. § 48(b).
121. Id. § 48(d). See Treas. Reg. § 1.48-4(e), T.D. 7203, 1972-2 C.B. 12, 28.
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-4(e), T.D. 7203, 1972-2 C.B. 12, 28.
123. I.R.C. § 48(d)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.48-4(a), T.D. 7203, 1972-2 C.B. 12, 26-27. The regula-
tions provide that the following conditions must be satisfied before the lessor can elect to treat
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss4/3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 24: p. 706
lessee to qualify for the credit, he must be the original user of the
property, i.e. the first person to use the property for its intended
function. 124 This requirement prevents the lessee from claiming
credit for property which he sold to the lessor and then leased back. 125
If the lessee does not meet these requirements, or cannot other-
wise take fill advantage of the investment credit, he can allow the
lessor to use the credit in exchange for lower rental charges. 126
B. Supplying the Property
The seller of tangible personal property will recognize gain or
loss on its sale, which will be classified as either capital or ordinary,
depending on the character of the asset in the hands of the seller. 127
Ordinary income is defined by the Internal Revenue Code to include
"any gain from the sale or exchange of property which is neither a
capital asset nor property described in section 1231(b)." 128 A seller
in the business of supplying property to buyers would not be selling
either capital assets 129 or section 1231(b) 130 property since those
items do not include "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."131 A
seller in the business of supplying property to potential buyers or
the lessee as the purchaser of the property for purposes of the I.R.C. § 38 credit: 1) the
property must be § 38 property in the lessor's hands; 2) the property must be new § 38 prop-
erty in the lessee's hands and the original use of the property must start with the lessor; 3) the
property would have been new § 38 property to the lessee if he had actually purchased the
property; 4) a statement of election to treat the lessee as purchaser must be filed; and 5) the
lessor cannot be a prohibited person under I.R.C. § 46(d)(1). Treas. Reg. § 1.48-4(a)(1), T.D.
7203, 1972-2 C.B. 12, 26-27.
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-4(a)(1)(ii), T.D. 7203, 1972-2 CB. 12, 26; Treas. Reg. § 1.48-4(b)
(1964).
125. The lessor is also not entitled to credit for this property since leased back property is
excluded from the definition of "used property" in I.R.C. § 48(c)(1). Id. This section provides:
"Property shall not be treated as 'used Section 38 property' if, after its acquisition by the tax-
payer, it is used by a person who used such property before such acquisition. ... Id.
126. See generally Canellos, The Investment Credit: Problem Areas and Planning Pos-
sibilities, 30 TAX LAW. 85 (1976); Schmidt & Larsen, supra note 102.
127. Ordinary gains and losses are defined in I.R.C. §9 64, 65. Id. Capital assets are defined
in I.R.C. § 1221. Id.
In certain situations, the gain will be ordinary even if the asset is capital. See id. § 1245.
One such situation is when depreciation is recaptured under section 1245 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, id. § 1245. See generally Schapiro, Recapture of Depreciation and Section 1245 of
the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 1483 (1963). Another example is when a sale of
depreciable property takes place between spouses, between an individual and a corporation
controlled directly or indirectly by the individual, or between two corporations controlled di-
rectly or indirectly by the same individual. I.R.C. § 1239. For the counterpart of this section in
the partnership area, see id. § 707(b)(2).
128. I.R.C. § 64.
129. See § 1221.
130. Id. § 1231(b).131. Id. §1231(b)(1)(B).
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lessees would therefore realize ordinary income.' 32 Moreover, any
gain on the transaction may be eligible for installment reporting.
133
A lessor of the property realizes rental income which will be
taxed as ordinary income. 134  As the owner of the property, the les-
sor will be entitled to deductions for depreciation 135 and any applica-
ble investment credit, l3 6 unless he elects to pass through the credit
to the lessee. 137
For one who is in the trade or business of supplying a product,
the taxable income from either a sale or a lease will thuts be ordinary
income. 138  If the sale is on an installment basis, then the timing of
the income payments will also be the same for a sale and a lease. As
previously stated, the investment credit treatment as well may be the
same under the pass through election.' 39  The only significant differ-
ence in the tax consequences to a supplier of a product in the ordi-
nary course of business is that a lessor can take a deduction for de-
preciation whereas a seller cannot.
140
C. Leases Treated as Sales
The tax differences between sales and leases are therefore be-
coming less important in many cases. Even in those situations in
which these differences would be significant, the importance of the
distinction has been diminished by the fact that, under certain cir-
cumstances, leases may be treated as conditional sales for tax pur-
poses. 141 These circumstances include, but are not limited to, the
following: whether the user of the property can acquire it at the end
of' the lease for either nominal or no consideration; 142 whether the
user acquires an equity interest in the property during the lease
132. Id. §§ 64, 1001(b).
133. See id. § 453.
134. See id. § 61(a)(5).
135. ld. § 167.
136. See id. §§ 38, 46-50.
137. See notes 118-25 and accompanying text supra.
138. See I.R.C. § 64.
139. See notes 118-25 and accompanying text supra.
140. See Davis, supra note 19, at 59-60. See notes 103-08 and accompanying text supra.
141. See generally Osterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1955); LTV
Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 39, 49-51 (1974); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 58 T.C. 836, 844-50 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 500 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974); Rev. Proe.
76-30, 1976-2 C.B. 647; Rev. Proc. 75-28, 1975-1 C.B. 752; Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715;
Gallagher, supra note 102; Landis, supra note 102, at 10; Lefevre, supra note 102.
142. See Lockhart Leasing Co. v. United States, 446 F.2d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1971); Oster-
reich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1955); LTV Corp. v. Commissioner, 63
T.C. 39, 50 (1974); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 836, 847-48 (1972),
aff'd per curiau, 500 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974); Rev. Proc. 75-21, § 4(3), 1975-1 C.B. 715, 716.
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term; 143 whether the lessor does not bear the full economic risk of
gain or loss during the lease by requiring the user to buy the prop-
erty at a given price or having the user bear the risk of casualty
loss; 144 whether the lessor has a substantial interest in the prop-
erty; 145 a comparison between the term of the lease and the useful
economic life of the property; 146 and the nature of the property and
its relationship to the facilities of' the user.147
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although there are still differences between a sale and a lease,
these differences are rapidly diminishing, particularly in the areas of
implied warranties, strict liability in tort, the doctrine of uncon-
scionability, antitrust law, and tax law. This has resulted because
courts are becoming more concerned with the purpose and substance
of' the transaction rather than with its florm. 148 By analyzing these
transactions according to business realities rather than legal for-
malities, the law is becoming more rational.
143. See Lockhart Leasing Co. v. United States, 446 F.2d 269, 271 (10th Cir. 1971); LTV
Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 39, 51 (1974); Rev. Proc. 75-21, § 4(4), 1975-1 C.B. 715, 716.
144. See Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Vt.
1964), aff'd per curiain, 342 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 818 (1965); LTV Corp. v.
Commissioner, 63 T.C. 39, 49-50 (1974); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 836, 849-50 (1972), affd per curiam, 500 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974); Rev. Proc. 75-28,
§ 4(.02), 1975-1 C.B. 752, 752-53; Rev. Proc. 75-21, § 4, 1975-1 C.B. 715, 716.
145. See Lockhart Leasing Co. v. United States, 446 F.2d 269, 271 (10th Cir. 1971); Bolger
v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 768-69 (1973); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 836, 849-50 (1972), aff d per curiam, 500 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974); Rev. Proc. 75-21,
§ 4(1), 1975-1 C.B. 715, 715-16; Lefevre, supra note 102, at 773-76.
146. See Rev. Ruil. 55-541, 1955-2 C.B. 19; Lefevre, supra note 102, at 770-71.
147. See Estate of Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1959); Mt. Mans-
field Television, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Vt. 1964), aff'd per curiam,
342 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 818 (1965); LTV Corp. v. United States, 63 T.C.
39, 51 (1974).
148. See Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 539, 543 (D. Vt.
1964), aff'd per curiam, 342 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 818 (1965); LTV Corp.
v. United States, 63 T.C. 39, 51 (1974); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.
836, 845 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 500 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974).
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